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JURISDICTION
The Utah Supreme Court has original appellate jurisdiction of
this case pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3) (j), not Utah Code
Ann. § 78-2-2(3)(k) as asserted by appellants.

The Utah Supreme

Court transferred this case to the Utah Court of Appeals for
disposition pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(4) . The Utah Court
of Appeals has appellate jurisdiction of this case pursuant to Utah
Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(k).
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
West One Trust Company disputes that appellants7 second and
third issues presented for review are properly before this Court
because these issues were not preserved in the district court.
Additionally,

appellants do not provide (i) any citation to the

record showing that these issues were preserved in the trial court
or (ii) any statement of grounds for seeking review of issues not
preserved in the trial court as required by Utah R. App. P.
24(a)(5).
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES
1.

Utah Code Ann. § 73-3-909. See Addendum A for a complete

recitation of that section.
2.

Utah Code Ann. § 73-3-1006.

complete recitation of that section.

1

See Addendum B for a

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case, Course of Proceedings, and Disposition of the
Case Below,
This appeal results from the administration of the estate of
Merlin R. Morrison, Sr. (the "Estate").

On October 31, 1995, the

district court found, among other things, that a cash distribution
made to the heirs of the Estate was improper pursuant to Utah Code
Ann, § 75-3-909 and ordered that "sufficient funds should be repaid
on a pro rata basis so that the claims against the estate could be
satisfied-" R. 1724-6. Appellants appeal only that portion of the
decision of the district court.
Statement of Facts
West One Trust Company ("West One") disputes the statement of
facts in substantial part set forth by appellants for the reason
that appellants misrepresent certain facts, fail to disclose
certain material facts, fail to make appropriate citation to the
record and otherwise attempt to mislead this Court.

A more

complete and accurate statement of the relevant facts follows.
Heirs and Personal Representatives.
1.

Merlin R. Morrison, Sr. ("Morrison, Sr.") died intestate

on January 17, 1983. R. 3-6 and 22-24.
2.

Morrison, Sr. died leaving the following heirs:
Name

Relationship

Edna R. Morrison

surviving spouse
2

Floren B. Nelson
John G. Morrison
Merlin R. Morrison, Jr.
Marjorie M. Steed
Michael H. Morrison
Kathleen M. Kelly
James C. Morrison
Tonya Willey

surviving
surviving
surviving
surviving
surviving
surviving
surviving
surviving

son
son
son
daughter
son
daughter
grandson
granddaughter

Laura Willey

surviving granddaughter

R. 3-6.
3.

The

district

court

representatives in this matter.
surviving

spouse,

representative

of

was
the

has

three

personal

Edna R. Morrison, the decedent's

appointed
Estate

appointed

as

serving

the
in that

first

personal

capacity

from

January 24, 1984 to May 19, 1988. R. 22-24 and 148-151.
4.

In an attempt to quell the in-family disputes that have

plagued the administration of this Estate, Floren B. Nelson, a
half-brother to the other children of the decedent, was appointed
as the successor personal representative of the Estate and served
from May 19, 1988 to February 14, 1990. R. 148-151 and 224-227.
5.

When it was finally determined that the appointment of an

independent personal representative would be required to assure the
proper administration of the Estate, on February 14, 1990, West One
was appointed as personal representative of the Estate and has
since served in that capacity.

R. 224-227 and 868-870.

3

Companion Actions
6.

By

the

time

West

One

was

appointed

personal

representative of the Estate, two companion actions had been filed
by the prior personal representatives. On January 6, 1986, Edna R.
Morrison

brought

an action

against Merlin

R. Morrison, Jr.

("Morrison, Jr.") relative to three parcels of real property
(commonly referred to as the Bacchus, Clark7s Lane and Burke's Lane
properties), the ownership of which the heirs disputed (the "1986
Action") .

The 1986 Action was ultimately dismissed.

On May 31,

1988, Floren B. Nelson brought, in essence, the same action against
Morrison, Jr. and Edna R. Morrison relative to the same properties
(the "1988 Action").
for Morrison, Jr.

The district court granted summary judgment
On appeal, this Court reversed the grant of

summary judgment, and remanded the case to the district court.
West One Trust Co. v. Morrison, 861 P. 2d 1058 (Utah Ct. App. 1993.)
On remand, a jury found that Morrison, Sr. intended to hold the
three properties in joint tenancy with Morrison, Jr.

Therefore,

upon Morrison, Sr.'s death, Morrison, Jr. became the sole owner of
the three properties and, accordingly, the Estate has no interest
in the properties.
7.

West One did not appeal the jury's verdict.

Appellants attempt to mislead this Court and claim that

the result of the 1988 Action has some bearing on this appeal.
Appellants7 Brief, pg. 4, f f 3, 1, 2; pg. 5, f f 4, 5.
4

The 1988

Action and the ultimate determination of ownership of the three
properties have absolutely nothing to do with this appeal• Rather,
the subject matter of this appeal is a parcel of real estate which
commonly has been referred to as the "9th South Property", the
relevant history of which is described below.
9th South Property
8.

As evidenced in the initial inventory filed in the

Estate, Morrison, Sr. owned at the time of his death an interest in
"4,000 shares of the capital stock of Morrison Investment Company,
a Utah corporation"

(the "Stock")•

R. 18-21

(See in particular

Schedule B, R. 20.)
9.

In order to settle disputes between the heirs of the

Estate and other Morrison family members (in particular, a brother
of Morrison, Sr.), the Stock was traded for a parcel of real
property and improvements located at 905 South State, Salt Lake
City, Utah (the "9th South Property").
10.

R. 287.

Neither Morrison, Sr. nor Morrison, Jr. ever held any

title interest in the 9th South Property, either individually or
jointly, prior to the death of Morrison, Sr.

See the closing

documents attached hereto as Addendum C.
11.

Due to the substantial time the Estate had been open,

within four months after its appointment as personal representative
in February 1990, West One engaged in settlement discussions with
5

the heirs in an attempt to settle the 1988 Action and close the
estate. Settlement negotiations continued thereafter on a regular
basis.

R. 1128,flf7-8.

12.

After settlement negotiations had broken down, which

negotiations even included the potential of conveying the 9th South
Property to the heirs as tenants-in-common, West One determined to
sell the 9th South Property.

Accordingly, West One secured an

appraisal of the 9th South Property as of November 1, 1991.

The

9th South Property was appraised at a value of $430,000.00.

R.

1137-1139.
13.

West One received two offers to purchase the 9th South

Property.

One

offer

received

$352,900.00, approximately
value.

from

a

third

party

was

for

$77,000.00 less than the appraised

R. 1131.

14.

The second offer to purchase the 9th South Property was

received

from

Morrison,

Jr.

for

$340,000.00,

$90,000.00 less than the appraised value.

approximately

Morrison, Jr.'s offer

contained certain terms and conditions including the condition that
the net sales proceeds be immediately distributed by the Estate to
the heirs.
15*

R.

1140-1144.

Pursuant to an order of the district court, on March 19,

1992, several of the heirs, representatives of West One, and
counsel for the parties again met to discuss the potential of
6

settling the 1988 Action, which was then on appeal, and to close
the Estate.

Three heirs that were present at the meeting stated

that they desired to pursue the appeal of the 1988 Action and to
reject Morrison, Jr.'s offer to purchase the 9th South Property.
R. 1130, fl4.
16.

From West One's perspective, to permit Morrison, Jr. to

purchase the 9th South Property at the amount of $340,000.00 could
well have constituted a breach of West One's fiduciary duties to
the other heirs of the Estate. The offer to purchase the 9th South
Property by Morrison, Jr. and to settle the 1988 Action, was also
conditioned on Morrison, Jr. receiving the entire interest in the
three properties which were the subject of the 1988 Action, and
which properties had a value in excess of $1 million.

The

settlement offer appeared to West One as an attempt by Morrison,
Jr. to abscond with the three properties and hopefully pacify the
other heirs with a fraction of what they were rightfully entitled
to receive.
17.

R. 1132.

In a effort to further his scheme, on July 14, 1992,

Morrison, Jr. filed a motion for an order requiring that West One
accept his offer to purchase the 9th South Property with the stated
terms and conditions and to close the Estate.
18.

R. 1105-6.

On December 23, 1992, the district court entered an order

(the "1992 Order") directing that in the event the 9th South
7

Property had not been sold to a third party by December 21, 1992,
West One was to accept Morrison, Jr.'s offer including the terms
and conditions contained in the offer and distribute the net sales
proceeds to the heirs of the Estate.
19.

On July 1, 1993, the sale of the 9th South Property to

Morrison, Jr. was consummated.
20.

R. 1158-9.

See Addendum C.

As evidenced by the closing documents, the transfer of

title of the 9th South Property was from West One, as personal
representative
Morrison.

of the Estate, to Morrison, Jr. and

The 9th South Property was never owned by Morrison, Sr.

and Morrison, Jr. in joint tenancy or otherwise.
21.

Edna R.

See Addendum C.

Subsequently, the net sales proceeds from the sale of the

9th South Property in the amount of $326,853.02 were distributed to
the heirs.

Edna R. Morrison received $163,427.00.

Each of the

surviving children of Morrison, Sr. received $23,346.00 and each of
the surviving grandchildren, taking through a deceased child,
received $7,782.00.
22.

See Addendum C.

After the trial of the 1988 Action in October 1994, West

One attempted to close the Estate in an orderly fashion. However,
Morrison, Jr. and other heirs challenged West One's efforts through
a series of motions. The first motion was an objection to payment
of the attorney fees and costs incurred by West One in the 1988
Action. Morrison, Jr. claimed that the 1988 Action was pursued in
8

bad faith. R. 1572-4. The district court entered an order finding
that the 1988 Action was brought in good faith and awarded attorney
fees and costs in the amount of $52,371.12 to Campbell Maack &
Sessions as a cost of administration of the Estate.
23.

R. 1721-2.

After the distribution of the sales proceeds from the 9th

South Property to the heirs, West One discovered that neither of
the prior personal representatives had filed federal or state
estate income tax returns for the years 1984 through 1986.

The

taxes, penalties and interest have not yet been finally determined
but

are

estimated

to be between

$30,000.00

and $60,000.00.

Following this discovery, Morrison, Jr. filed another motion and
claimed that the payment of the estate income taxes, penalties and
interest had priority over the payment of attorney fees and costs.
R. 1625-1630.
24.

On October 31, 1995, the district court entered an order

(the "1995 Order") finding that (1) the attorney fees and costs are
a cost of administration and have priority as to payment over the
estate income taxes and (ii) "[t]he previous distribution to the
heirs in the amount of $326,000.00 from the sales proceeds of the
900 South Property was improper and sufficient funds should be
repaid on a pro rata basis so that the claims against the estate
may be satisfied."

R. 1724-6.

9

25.
of

On November 30, 1995, appellants filed their Joint Notice

Appeal

relative

to

the

distribution recovery issue.
26.

1995

Order,

appealing

only

the

R. 1727-9.

As of March 31, 1996, the Estate had cash assets of

$25,928.00 but unpaid obligations in excess of $80,000.00 and
potentially much more depending on the penalties and interest
assessed relative to the unpaid estate income taxes.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
First, the 1995 Order does not constitute a final order from
which an appeal may be taken.

Accordingly, this appeal should be

dismissed.
Second, the 9th South Property was not owned by Morrison, Sr.
and Morrison, Jr. in joint tenancy at the time of Morrison, Sr.'s
death.

The 9th South Property became an asset of the Estate

following Morrison, Sr.'s death as the result of a trade for 4,000
shares of stock in the Morrison Investment Company that Morrison,
Sr. owned at the time of his death.
Third, pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 73-3-909, the distribution
of the 9th South Property sales proceeds was "improper." Recovery
by West One from the heirs of a sufficient amount of the improper
distribution to pay the remaining obligations of the Estate is
expressly

provided

for

by

statute,

adjudication, estoppel or limitation.
10

and

is

not

barred

by

Finally, recovery by West One of a portion of the improper
distribution to pay the remaining obligations of the Estate does
not void the sale of the 9th South Property by West One to
Morrison, Jr. or permit Morrison, Jr. to void that transaction.
ARGUMENT
I
THE 1995 ORDER IS NOT A FINAL
APPEALABLE ORDER, AND THIS COURT
SHOULD DISMISS THIS APPEAL.
The 1995 Order is not a final appealable order and was not
certified for appeal by the district court. As such, this appeal
is not properly before this Court, and should be dismissed.
Utah Rule of Appellate Procedure 3 provides for appeals from
"final orders and judgments." Utah R. App. P. 3 (emphasis added).
Interpreting this rule, the Utah Supreme Court has stated:
The final judgment rule . . . precludes a
party from taking an appeal from any orders or
judgments that are not final."
A.J. Mackay Co. v. Okland Const. Co., 817 P.2d 323, 325 (Utah
1991).

Final orders and judgments are those which "end[] the

controversy between the parties litigant." Salt Lake City Corp. v.
Lavton, 600 P.2d 538, 539 (Utah 1979).
One exception to the final judgment rule permits appeals from
non-final orders or judgments certified for appeal by the trial
court under Rule 54(b), U.R.C.P.
11

However, where "the order

appealed from was not final and was not certified nor eligible for
certification under Rule 54(b), it [is] not properly taken.

In a

situation such as this, the remedy is dismissal of the appeal."
Okland/ 817 P.2d at 325 (emphasis added).
In the

instant

case, appellants

appeal

the

1995 Order

requiring recovery of funds from the distributees of the Estate.
The 1995 Order does not completely resolve the controversy between
the parties, in that it does not decide the following issues: the
award of any additional attorney fees to close the estate; the
determination of the amount of estate income taxes owed; the
payment of those taxes; the amount of funds to be recovered from
distributees on either a pro rata basis or on some other basis, if
a particular distributee is insolvent; and the closing of the
estate.

The 1995 Order addressed only the discreet issues of the

priority of payment of the attorney fees and costs and the estate
income taxes, and the propriety of the distribution of the 9th
South Property proceeds.
Additionally, the district court did not certify the 1995
Order for appeal, nor did appellants seek such certification prior
to bringing their appeal.

Therefore, under Okland and Layton,

because the 1995 Order is not a final order and was not certified
for appeal, this Court should dismiss the appeal.

12

II
THE 9TH SOUTH PROPERTY WAS NOT OWNED BY
MORRISON, SR. AND MORRISON, JR. IN JOINT TENANCY
AT THE TIME OF MORRISON, SR.'S DEATH.
Assuming arguendo that this Court determines that this appeal
is properly taken, appellant's arguments are without merit or
support in the law and this Court should affirm the district
court's 1995 order and dismiss the appeal on the merits.
Appellants first argue in their brief that the 9th South
Property should never have been considered an asset of the Estate
in that Morrison, Sr. and Morrison, Jr. owned the property in joint
tenancy

at the time of Morrison, Sr.'s death.

Apparently,

appellants do not understand or are deliberately misstating the
facts surrounding how the 9th South Property came to be an asset of
the Estate.

The 9th South Property was never owned by Morrison,

Sr. or Morrison, Jr., either individually or in joint tenancy, at
any time prior to Morrison Sr.'s death.

Morrison, Jr. purchased

the 9th South Property from the Estate.

The 9th South Property

became an asset of the Estate following Morrison, Sr.'s death, as
the result of a trade for 4,000 shares of stock in the Morrison
Investment Company that Morrison, Sr. owned at the time of his
death.

The 9th South Property was not one of the three parcels of

real estate considered in the trial of the 1988 Action dealing with

13

the joint tenancy ownership issue•

Appellant's argument in their

brief on this point is ludicrous and merits no further discussion.
Ill
THE DISTRIBUTION OF THE 9TH SOUTH PROPERTY
SALES PROCEEDS WAS AN IMPROPER DISTRIBUTION
AND RECOVERY OP THE DISTRIBUTION IS NOT
BARRED BY ADJUDICATION, ESTOPPEL OR LIMITATION.
Appellants do not appeal the district court's decision that
the attorney fees and costs owed to Campbell Maack & Sessions and
the estate income taxes are valid obligations of the Estate or that
the obligation for attorney fees and costs has priority in payment
over the obligation for estate income taxes.

Further, appellants

do not raise in their brief the issue of whether the distribution
of the 9th South Property sales proceeds was "improper" as found by
the district court.

The sole issue on appeal is whether West One

is barred from recovery of the improper distribution under Utah
law.
Pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 75-3-909, the district court held
in the 1995 Order that the distribution was "improper" and ordered
that "sufficient funds should be repaid on a pro rata basis so that
the claims against the estate may be satisfied."

R. 1724-6. Utah

Code Ann. § 75-3-909 provides:
Unless the distribution or payment no longer can be
questioned because of adjudication, estoppel, or
limitation, a distributee of property improperly
distributed or paid, or a claimant who was
improperly paid, is liable to return the property
14

improperly
received
and
its
income
since
distribution if he has the property. If he does
not have the property, then he is liable to return
the value as of the date of disposition of the
property improperly received and its income and
gain received by him.
The Editorial Board Comment to the section provides:
The term "improperly" as used in this section must
be read in light of § 75-3-703 and the manifest
purpose of this and other sections of the Code to
shift questions concerning the propriety of various
distributions
from
the
fiduciary
to
the
distributees
in
order
to
prevent
every
administration from becoming an adjudicated matter.
Thus, a distribution may be "authorized at the
time" as contemplated by S 75-3-703, and still be
"improper" under this section. Section 75-3-703 is
designed to permit a personal representative to
distribute without risk in some cases, even though
there has been no adjudication.
When an
unadjudicated distribution has occurred, the rights
of persons to show that the basis for the
distribution (e.g., an informally probated will, or
informally issued letters of administration) is
incorrect, or that the basis was improperly applied
(erroneous
interpretation,
for
example)
is
preserved against distributees by this section.
Id. cmt. (emphasis added).

Thus, the sole issue to be decided in

this appeal is whether recovery by West One of the improperly
distributed sales proceeds is barred by "adjudication, estoppel or
limitation."

Utah Code Ann. § 75-3-909.

Adjudication
In their brief, appellants assert no claim of an adjudication,
and West One knows of no adjudication made, which would bar the
application of Utah Code Ann. § 75-3-909 in this case.
15

The

distribution was made pursuant to court order due to the fact that
West One had resisted the distribution.

West One resisted the

distribution due to the many contingencies that were still present
in the administration of the Estate at that time.

The 1992 Order

does not explicitly, or even implicitly, bar the application of
Utah Code Ann. § 75-3-909, which permits West One to recover the
distribution,

if

funds

are

needed

to

pay

valid

costs

of

administration of the Estate.
Estoppel
In their brief, appellants argue that the "law of the case"
doctrine bars application of Utah Code Ann. § 75-3-909 and estops
West One from the recovery of the improper distribution.

The "law

of the case" doctrine has been applied "when addressing at least
four distinct sets of problems." Thurston v. Box Elder County, 892
P.2d 1034, 1037 n.2 (Utah 1995).

The branch of the doctrine which

appellants attempt to apply in this case provides that "a court is
justified in refusing to reconsider matters it resolved in a prior
ruling in the same case for reasons of efficiency and consistency."
Id. at 1038.
The disputed matters resolved in the 1992 Order were that
(i) the 9th South Property was to be sold to Morrison, Jr. and
(ii) the net sales proceeds were to be distributed to the heirs.
West One complied with both elements of the 1992 Order.
16

In the

1992

Order,

the

district

court

did

notf

however, make

any

additional explicit ruling, or even intimate, that the distribution
could not eventually be recovered if needed to pay the valid
obligations of the Estate.
Even if this Court were to consider that the ruling of the
district court in the 1992 Order constituted the "law of the case"
to the effect that the distribution could not be recovered by West
One, the Utah Supreme Court stated in Thurston that "(1) when there
has been an intervening change of controlling authority; (2) when
new evidence has become available; or

(3) when the court is

convinced that its prior decision was clearly erroneous and would
work a manifest injustice", a court may reopen issues previously
decided. Id. at 1039. The district court must have considered the
later two conditions as a basis for reopening the issue of whether
the distribution could be recovered by West One.
As

to

the

second

condition

of

"new

evidence

becoming

available," numerous items of evidence and facts and the resolution
of related issues were not before the district court as of December
23, 1992.
determined.

First, the outcome of the 1988 Action had not been
Had the jury in the 1988 Action concluded that

Morrison, Sr. and Morrison, Jr. did not hold the three parcels of
real property in joint tenancy at the time of Morrison, Sr.'s
death, the Estate would have received property with a value in
17

excess of $500,000.00 and the present problem of insufficient
assets in the Estate to pay its obligations would not be present.
Second, the amount of the attorney fees and costs incurred by West
One to prosecute the 1988 Action had not been determined as of
December 23, 1992. Third, the fact that additional estate income
taxes were due was not discovered until after December 23, 1992.
Certainly, these subsequently discovered facts and subsequently
decided issues would permit the district court to reconsider its
ruling made in the 1992 Order.
The
condition

district

court may

permitting

also have

reconsideration

of

considered
a

prior

the third
ruling

and

concluded in 1995 that its prior decision was clearly erroneous and
would work a manifest injustice.

A foundational tenant of Utah

probate law is that "[t]he assets of an estate belong first to
creditors with the remainder to heirs and legatees and devisees."
Dennett v. First Security Bank, N.A. , 439 P.2d 459, 461 (Utah
1968) .

It would be clearly erroneous and constitute manifest

injustice for valid claims of the Estate for estate income taxes
and attorney fees and costs to remain unpaid, while the heirs
receive distributions in excess of $326,000.00.
In summary, West One has complied with the terms of the 1992
Order in that the 9th South Property was sold to Morrison, Jr. and
the net sales proceeds have been distributed to the heirs.
18

The

"law of the case" doctrine does not estop application of Utah Code
Ann. § 75-3-909 relative to the 1995 Order.
Limitation
Appellants next argue that Utah Code Ann. § 75-3-1006 is a
statute of limitation which bars application of Utah Code Ann.
§ 75-3-909.

Utah Code Ann. § 75-3-1006 provides

(1) Unless previously adjudicated in a
formal testacy proceeding or in a proceeding
settling
the
accounts
of
a
personal
representative or otherwise barred, the claim
of any claimant to recover from a distributee
who is liable to pay the claim, and the right
of any heir or devisee or of a successor
personal
representative
acting
in
their
behalf,
to
recover
property
improperly
distributed or the value thereof from any
distributee is barred at the later of:
(a) as to a claim by a creditor of the
decedent, one year after the decedent's death;
and
(b)
as to any other claimant and any
heir or devisee, at the later of:
(i) three years after the decedent's
death; or
(ii) one year after the time of
distribution thereof.
(2) This section does not bar an action to
recover property or value received as the
result of fraud.
This section does not limit the time in which a personal
representative may recover an improper distribution but rather
limits only the time in which creditors with claims, and heirs and
devisees of a decedent, or a successor personal representative
acting in their behalf, may bring an action against distributees.
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The Editorial Board Comment provides "[t]his section describes an
ultimate time limit for recovery by creditors, heirs and devisees
of a decedent from distributees. . . . (3) The limitation of this
section

ends

the

possibility

of

appointment

of

a

personal

representative to correct an erroneous distribution. . . . "

Id.

West One is neither a creditor, heir, nor devisee of the Estate.
See, Utah Code Ann. § 75-1-201(4) , (8) , (17). Nor is West One a
successor personal representative.

West One is the personal

representative that made the distribution and can, therefore,
recover it.

Accordingly, there is no statute of limitation which

bars West One's recovery of the improper distribution of the sales
proceeds from the heirs.
In conclusion, the distribution of the proceeds from the sale
of the 9th South Property by West One to the heirs constituted an
improper

distribution.

West

One may

recover

that

distribution pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 75-3-909.

improper

The recovery

is not barred by adjudication, estoppel, or limitation.
IV
RECOVERY OF THE SALES PROCEEDS FROM THE HEIRS DOES
NOT VOID THE 9TH SOUTH PROPERTY SALES TRANSACTION NOR DOES
IT PERMIT MORRISON, JR. TO VOID THE SALES TRANSACTION.
Appellants argue that allowing West One to recover a portion
of the sales proceeds from the heirs voids the sale of the 9th

20

South

Property

transaction.

or

should

permit Morrison, Jr. to

void

the

Both arguments are without merit and must fail.

First, this issue was not argued in the district court and may
not be raised for the first time on appeal.

Kleinert v. Kimball

Elevator Co.. 905 P.2d 301 (Utah Ct. App. 1995) ("We are governed
by the general principle that matters not put in issue before the
trial court may not be raised for the first time on appeal.")
Accordingly, this Court may not entertain or consider this argument
of appellants.
Second, the ruling of the district court in the 1992 Order,
and the conditions and terms of the sale have been performed by
West One.

The property was sold by West One to Morrison, Jr. and

the proceeds were distributed to the heirs.
argue to the contrary.

Appellants cannot

As stated above, there is no condition in

the offer to purchase the 9th South Property by Morrison, Jr. or in
the 1992 Order that the sales proceeds could not ultimately be
recovered

by West One

from the heirs to pay

the costs of

administration or other obligations of the Estate, which recovery
is expressly provided for by statute. West One has fully performed
any contractual or statutory duties it had and has fully complied
with all orders of the district court.
For the above-stated reasons, the 9th South Property sales
transaction is neither void nor voidable by Morrison, Jr.
21

CONCLUSION
For the above-stated reasons, this appeal should be dismissed
or the 1995 Order of the district court should be affirmed.

West

One respectfully requests, in addition, that it be awarded its
attorney fees and costs incurred herein.
DATED this

of June 1996.
CAMPBELL MAACK &, SESSIQJ

:LARK W. SESSIC
DEAN C. ANDREASEN
Attorneys for Appellee
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on the ^Pffi day of June 1996, true and
correct copies of the foregoing BRIEF OF APPELLEE was mailed,
postage prepaid, first-class, to:
Lowell V. Summerhays
ADAMSON & SUMMERHAYS
448 East 6400 South, Suite 135
Murray, Utah 84107

AjUAnn. I . Umh.
'/UlMri
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ADDENDUM

A -

Utah Code Ann. § 75-3-909

B -

Utah Code Ann. § 75-3-1006

C -

Closing documents relative to sale of the 9th South
Property by West One to Morrison, Jr.
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Tab A

75-3-909. Improper distribution — Liability of distributee.
Unless the distribution or payment no longer can be questioned because of
adjudication, estoppel, or limitation, a distributee of property improperly distributed or paid, or a claimant who was improperly paid, is liable to return the
property improperly received and its income since distribution if he has the
property. If he does not have the property, then he is liable to return the value
as of the date of disposition of the property improperly received and its income
and gain received by him.
History: C. 1953, 75-3-909, enacted by L.
1975, ch. 150, § 4.
Editorial Board Comment. — The term
"improperly" as used in this section must be
read in light of § 75-3-703 and the manifest
purpose of this and other sections of the Code
to shift questions concerning the propriety of
various distributions from the fiduciary to the
distributees m order to prevent every administration from becoming an adjudicated matter.

Thus, a distribution may be "authorized at the
time" as contemplated by § 75-3-703, and still
be "improper" under this section Section
75-3-703 is designed to permit a personal representative to distribute without risk m some
cases, even though there has been no adjudication When an unadjudicated distribution has
occurred, the rights of persons to show that the
basis for the distribution (e.g., an informally
probated will, or informally issued letters of

PROBATE OF WILLS AND ADMINISTRATION
administration) is incorrect, or that the basis
was improperly applied (erroneous interpretation, for example) is preserved against distributees by this section
The definition of "distributee" to include the
trustee and beneficiary of a testamentary trust
in 75-1-201(10) is important m allocating liabilities that may arise under §§ 75-3-909 and

75-3-911

75-3-910 on improper distribution by the personal representative under an informally probated will. The provisions of §§ 75-3-909 and
75-3-910 are based on the theory that liability
follows the property and the fiduciary is absolved from liability by reliance upon the informally probated will.

TabB

75-3-1006. Limitations on actions and proceedings against
distributees.
(1) Unless previously adjudicated in a formal testacy proceeding or in a
proceeding settling the accounts of a personal representative or otherwise
barred, the claim of any claimant to recover from a distributee who is liable to
pay the claim, and the right of any heir or devisee or of a successor personal
representative acting in their behalf, to recover property improperly distributed or the value thereof from any distributee is barred at the later of:
(a) as to a claim by a creditor of the decedent, one year after the decedent's death; and
(b) as to any other claimant and any heir or devisee, at the later of:
(i) three years after the decedent's death; or
(ii) one year after the time of distribution thereof.
(2) This section does not bar an action to recover property or value received
as the result of fraud.
History: C. 1953, 75-3-1006, enacted by L.
1975, ch. 150, § 4; 1992, ch. 179, § 11.
Amendment Notes. — The 1992 amendment, effective July 1, 1992, deleted "forever"
before "barred" near the end of the introductory language of Subsection (1); added new
Subsection (l)(a) and the introductory paragraph in Subsection (1Kb); and redesignated
former Subsections (l)(a) and (1Kb) as (l)(b)(i)
and (lKbKii).
Editorial Board Comment. — This section
describes an ultimate time limit for recovery
by creditors, heirs and devisees of a decedent
from distributees. It is to be noted: (1)
§ 75-3-107 imposes a general limit of three
years from death on one who must set aside an
informal probate in order to establish his
rights, or who must secure probate of a latediscovered will after an estate has been administered as intestate. Hence the time limit of
§ 75-3-107 may bar one who would claim as an
heir or devisee sooner than this section, although it would never cause a bar prior to
three years from the decedent's death. (2) This
section would not bar recovery by a supposed

decedent whose estate has been probated. See
§ 75-3-412. (3) The limitation of this section
ends the possibility of appointment of a personal representative to correct an erroneous
distribution as mentioned in §§ 75-3-1005 and
75-3-1008. If there have been no adjudications
under § 75-3-409, or possibly §§ 75-3-1001 or
75-3-1002, estate of the decedent which is discovered after administration has been closed
may be the subject of different distribution
than that attending the estate originally administered.
The last sentence excepting actions or suits
to recover property kept from one by the fraud
of another may be unnecessary in view of the
blanket provision concerning fraud in Chapter
1. See § 75-1-106.
Coordinating Clause. — Laws 1992, ch.
179, § 18 provides: "The amendments to Sections 75-3-801, 75-3-803, 75-3-806, 75-3-807,
75-3-1003, and 75-3-1006 shall apply only to
the estates of decedents who die on or after the
effective date of this act [July 1, 1992]. All
other amendments shall be effective for all estates upon the effective date of this act."

TabC

WHEN RECORDED RETURN TO:
WEST ONE TRUST COMPANY
107 SOUTH MAIN STREET #303
P.O. BOX 3058
SALT LAKE CITY, UT 84110-3058
PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE'S DEED
FOR AND IN CONSIDERATION OF Ten Dollars ($10.00) and other
good and valuable consideration, WEST ONE TRUST COMPANY, acting in
its capacity as the PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE OF THE ESTATE OF MERLIN
R. MORRISON, hereby CONVEYS AND SELLS, WITHOUT WARRANTY, unto EDNA
MORRISON AND MERLIN R. MORRISON JR, HER SON, AS JOINT TENANTS, WITH
FULL RIGHTS OF SURVIVORSHIP AND NOT AS TENANTS IN COMMON Grantee,
the following described tract of real property situate in SALT LAKE
County, State of UTAH:
LOTS 1 TO 5 INCLUSIVE, BLOCK 1 LINDEN PARK, AMENDED PLAT AS
RECORDED IN THE OFFICE OF THE RECORDER OF SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE
OF UTAH.
«=>'"

Witness the hand of said Grantor, this

d a y o f July 1, 1993

West One Trust Company
Personal Representative of
the Estate Of MERLIN,R.^MORRISON

By:

kr^9z

Title: 7 ^ <
State of Utah

)

:ss

County of Salt Lake )
, personally appeared before
On this 1st
day of July, 1993
LESIEUR
who said that he is
the
undersigned
notary,
CEVAN
J.
me,
the Property Officer of West One Trust Company and who proved to me
his identity through documentary evidence in the form of a driver's
license to be the signer of the foregoing instrument and who
acknowledged to me that he execut/Bek it^f or its stated purpose.
NOTARY PUBLIC
/
RESIDING AT: Salt'Lake City, Utah
My Commission Expires:

01-Jul-93
S E L L E R

(S)

F I N A L

03:38 PM
C L O S I N G

S T A T E M E N T

Prepared by
METRO NATIONAL TITLE
111 EAST BROADWAY, SUITE 111
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84111
(801) 363-6633
eller(s)

WEST ONE TRUST COMPANY, PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE OF THE
ESTATE OF MERLIN R. MORRISON
EDNA MORRISON, MERLIN R. MORRISON, JR.

uyer(s)
ender
roperty....
losing date
lie Number,

Lot 1-5 Block 1 LINDEN PARK AMENDED PLAT SALT LAKE C
07/01/1993
92006821

ALES PRICE

340,000.00

LUS CREDITS:
TOTAL CREDITS
SALES PRICE PLUS TOTAL CREDITS
ESS CHARGES:
ELINOUENT 1990 TAXES
OUNTY TAXES 01/01/1993 TO 07/01/1993
ETTLEMENT OR CLOSING FEE
PAYEE: METRO NATIONAL TITLE
ITLE INSURANCE
PAYEE: METRO NATIONAL TITLE
TOTAL CHARGES
GLANCE DUE TO SELLER

0.00
340,000.00
8,209.99
3,031.99
600.00
1,305.00
13,146.98
326,853.02

My signature hereon acknowledges approval of tax prorations, and
ignifies my understandmq that prorations were based on fiqures for
receding year, or estimates for current year, and in event of any
lanqe for current year, all necessary adiustments must be made between
eller and Purchaser direct; likewise any DEFICIT in delinquent taxes
ill be reimbursed to Title Company by the Seller. The undersiqned further
^knowledges the above information was assembled from sources other than
u s company and therefore, this company cannot quarantee the accuracy
nereof. Interest on existing liens is figured to the date indicated
id additional interest may have to be collected, if necessary, to
scure release from the lienholder.
We approve the foreqomg settlement statement, in its entirety,
jthorize payments inyaccordance therewith and acknowledge receipt of
copy thereof.
:LLER
: L L E R ^ ?"/"
^ V sfd'/^—772
-^^
& c//
"TRO

WATOONA^

TITLE

J2L

Escrow Ofzicer

C~£

0I-Jul-93
B U Y E R

(S>

F I N A L

12:53 PM
C L O S I N G

S T A T E M E N T

Prepared by
METRO NATIONAL TITLE
111 EAST BROADWAY, -SUITE 111
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84111
(801) 363-6633
ler(s)
erls)
ier......
-»ert y . . . .
jinq d a t e

- Number.

WEST ONE TRUST COMPANY, PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE OF THE
ESTATE OF MERLIN R. MORRISON
fDNA MORRISON, MERLIN R. MORRISON, JR.
Lot 1-5 Block 1 LINDEN PARK AMENDED PLAT SALT LAKE C
07/01/1993
92006821

S PRICE

340,000.00

CHARGES:
LEMENT OR CLOSING FEE
YEE: METRO NATIONAL TITLE
RDING FEES DEED S 20.00

200.00
20.00

TOTAL CHARGES
SALES PRICE PLUS TOTAL CHARGES
CREDITS:
TY TAXES 01/01/1993 TO 07/01/1993
TOTAL CREDITS

220.00
340,220.00
3,031.99
3,0 31.99
337,108.01

3CE DUE FROM BUYER

My signature hereon acknowledges approval of tax prorations, and
fies my understanding that prorations were based on figures for
ding year, or estimates for current year, and in event of any
e for current year, all necessary adjustments must foe made between
r and Purchaser direct; likewise any DEFICIT in delinquent taxes
be reimbursed to Title Company by the Seller. The undersigned further
wledges the above information was assembled from sources other than
company and therefore, this company cannot guarantee the accuracy
of. Interest on existing liens is figured to the date indicated
iditional interest may have to be collected, if necessary, to
3 release from the lienholder.
We approve the foregoing settlement statement, in its entirety,
•size payments in accordance therewith and acknowledge receipt of
vr thereof.
>4rWv>g/ •

FIONAL

TITLE

-fuskr

